Klein uses reasoning by analogy to liken space warfare to maritime warfare.

By using maritime theory based on the work of Sir Julian Corbett, a suitable strategic framework can be defined and a relevant space strategy subsequently extrapolated.

Corbett provides a strategic context that is unique to the maritime environment and, as a result, Corbett clarifies and elucidates the strategy of warfare where land and sea meet.

Of all the historically based strategies (land, naval, maritime, air), maritime strategy comes closest to representing the diverse concerns and breadth of issues regarding warfare in space.

  • Space operations and activities have national power implications in peace and war
  • Space operations are interdependent with land, naval, maritime, and air operations
  • The idea of sea lines of communications can be readily adapted to space as celestial lines of communications
  • Command of the sea can be readily adapted to space as command of space
  • Space, like the sea, has strategic positions
  • Often times, the key to command of space is effective blockage of the opponent's strategic positions
  • For those unable to utilize lines of communications, space (just as the sea) becomes a barrier
  • Space forces should use the principles of dispersal and concentration as maritime forces do.

Offensive actions take something from the adversary, while defensive actions prevent the adversary from gaining or achieving something.

Klein acknowledges Clausewitzian thought on offense and defense: even in space warfare, defense is the stronger form of warfare.

Weaponization is perfectly acceptable as a means of self defense under the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty

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