Huntington, The Soldier and the State

Notes from Gloves / three forms of national security policy: military, internal security, and situational security (erosive threats from changes in economic, social, demographic, or political conditions) 1 / each form operates on two levels: operating level (immediate means taken) and institutional level (formulation and execution of policy) 1 / operating level is subordinate to institutional level 2 / military institutions must balance between a social imperative and a functional imperative 2 / until ‘50s, question was “what civ-mil balance will least hurt society?” but now, “what civ-mil balance will best maintain security?” 3 / principal focus of civ-mil is officer to state 3 / officer is a member of a profession; that’s pretty new 7 / professionalism = expertise, responsibility, and corporateness (sense of unity with each other and separation from laymen) 8-10 / expertise is in management of violence 11-12 / professionalism came from functional specialization, growth of nation state, democratic ideology, and single locus of authority (constitution, e.g.) 32-5 / Clausewitz’s establishment of war as having a dual nature (autonomous science yet subordinate science due to external purposes i.e. politics) contributed to professionalism 56 / military virtue of the army isn’t rooted in its cause but in its skill in the conduct of violence 57 / military ethic sees man as fallen, and change (not progress) as inevitable 63-4 / military ethic holds the state to be the basic unit of political organization, self-help, strong military, isolationist 64-5 / “the tendency of the politician is to court favor by curbing the arms budget and simultaneously pursuing an adventurous foreign policy” 70 / Napoleon unified military and political expertise – he was the last 70 / military officer represents military needs through legal advocacy, advises public bodies on military issues, and executes state decisions 72 / “the military profession exists to serve the state” 73 / great ch 3 summary in one para 79 / military ethic is realistic and conservative 79 / a professional officer class made civilian control more difficult 82-3 / civilian control decreases the more the officers are involved in politics 83 / three psbl levels of mil authority: mil control of govt, mil and civ have parallel structures, and mil subordinate to sovereign or minister 87 / pervasive American liberalism led to indifference to international affairs, application of domestic solutions to international problems, and a search for objectivity in international affairs 149 / American liberalism tends to cast the military as the enemy 154 / four liberal reasons an army is bad: threat to democracy, threat to economy, threat to peace, threat to liberty 156 / liberal principles of army: military defense is the duty of every citizen, democratic country must have a democratic military, military purpose must include social welfare in addition to fighting wars 157 / framers considered all citizens soldiers 164-5 / “purse and sword ought never to get into the same hands” 177-8 / President gets office, not function (CinC of Army/Navy, not “to command Army/Navy”) 178 / post-Civil War professionalizers replaced Clausewitz’s genius with the general staff 257 / “soldiers are soldiers and not lawyers” 261 / Navy was different, because of its diplomatic missions 262 / both held “strategy was the servant of statesmanship” 262 / Americans have never experienced a Jena or Sedan to curb national arrogance 266 / post-WWII, security needs dictated liberal America maintain a standing army in times of peace 345 / some figured both US and USSR would become garrison states 348 / an option besides the garrison state would be a fusion of civ and mil: either mil ethos would adapt to incorporate political, economic, and social factors; or military leaders would have to assume nonmilitary responsibilities 351-4 / we mostly did the second (military governorships, corporate moves – esp mil-indust complex, civil jobs, advisory groups) 354ff / MacArthurs and Eisenhowers are exceptions to Shermans and Pershings 367 / institutional frameworks changed JCS involvement 375 / Truman framework 376-91 / Eisenhower framework (Ike wanted agreement, not advocacy) 391-9 / after WWII as never before, military policy became a principal public interest 401 / how much loyalty to the CinC must be displayed during “the annual psychic crisis of the JCS before the congressional appropriations committees”? 417 / constitution demands strategic pluralism – different weapons systems to fit diverse security threats 418 / due to separation of powers dialectic, too much exec support for a bill can doom it in Congress 420 / post-WWII climate in US reflected increasing conservatism 457-8 / resurgence of international realism countering Wilsonian utopianism 459 / “A political officer corps, rent with faction, subordinated to ulterior ends, lacking prestige but sensitive to the appeals of popularity, would endanger the security of the state. A strong, integrated, highly professional officer corps, on the other hand, immune to politics and respected for its military character, would be a steadying balance wheel in the conduct of policy.” 464 / “Modern man may well find his monastery in the Army.” 465

seminar notes / how you decide is more important than the execution of the policy / if the professional military officer is one who manages violence, then what if you are a military officer who doesn’t manage violence? / subjective civil control = don’t have assured mil obedience, so gotta manipulate; objective civil control = mil obedience assured, so can fence an area for mil independence / risk of objective civil control is that they’ll be out of synch / Cohen’s “normal” is Huntington’s “objective”

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