Matt Domsalla

SAASS 632/7

Ways of War and Peace Precis

In Ways of War and Peace, Columbia professor of US Foreign and Security Policy Michael Doyle “assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the explano Doyle, each theory has a “comparative advantage in explaining certain kinds of international events and the foreign policy of different types of actors.” (34) In Part IV, Doyle examines intervention and redistribution and the potential policy guidance from the three theoretical perspectives.

Introduction: The Politics of Peace and War

· Each worldview has two aspects: an empirical, analytic theory to explain political outcomes, to tell us about the causes of war and peace; and normative theory that corresponds to political values. (17 – 18)

· Realism: state of war (constant possibility of war), “realpolitik” (self-interested, prepare for war, calculate relative balances of power). (18)

· Liberalism: cultivable ‘garden’ combing state of war with the possibility of a state of peace; state is a coalition or conglomerate of coalitions and interests; state’s interests determined interests, ideals, and activities of members who capture governmental authority. (19)

· Socialism: war between the classes. (20)

· What should theories be able to do? (1) Acknowledge the significance of competing ends – within and among individuals and states, (2) Interpret how we assess threats and opportunities, reflecting both interests and institutions, and (3) Address questions of identity in the process of answering 1 and 2. Theory surrenders: (1) particularities of the moment and the individual, (2) accounts of the particular capacities of sate in a specific international setting. (23 – 25)

· “Theory there can never serve as a history or a recipe; it is a guide to how to analyze and justify policy, now and in the past, and not a replacement for strategy… theories can help structure the interpretation of history… Theory can lend coherence to observations and thereby make them the interpretations that make sense of otherwise meaningless or at least confusing events, such as the endings and beginnings of cold wars.” (26)

· Three levels of analysis (Waltz, Man, the State and War): explain war by human nature, international structure of states, and international anarchy. (28 – 29)

· “Individual leaders sometimes provoke a war, but the fundamental reason why interstate relations are in a state of war is that international anarchy means there is nothing to prevent it.” (29)

· “International anarchy produces both peace and war.” (29)

Introduction. The Varieties of Liberalism

· “Liberal state voiding or mitigating the occasions of war is then the Lockean Liberal strategy of peace. Three inconveniences in the state of nature that could lead to war: (1) bias and ignorance, (2) partiality, passion, and revenge, (3) weakness and fear. (219 – 224)

o “Bentham is a Utilitarian, a calculator of pleasures and pains, an advocate of the great happiness of the greatest number.” (226)

· “Democracy assists the peace education effort by making officials responsible to the public, and it is the public that bears the (very large) costs of war while the elite reaps its (much smaller) benefits in, for example, ‘places for official employment.” (228)

7. Commercial Pacifism: Smith and Schumpeter

· “Commercial pacifism rests on the view that market societies are fundamentally against war.” (230)

· Smith – “The state of course has a legitimate role [domestically]: It should do what the market cannot.” States have three duties: (1) defense, (2) administration of justice, and (3) public goods/works (bridges, roads, and canals). (233)

· “[Smith] argues that in rejecting colonialism and adopting free trade, rational Liberal political economists would thereby eliminate two potent causes of aggressive war. But his larger contribution lies in outlining an evolutionary model of the political economy of international security that explains the changing economics of defense and identifies a political economy conducive to peace.” (234)

· Smith denounces Mercantilism as advocating ‘beggaring all their neighbors,’ a view he sees as being foisted on a weak public equally by the ‘violence’ of rulers and the ‘monopolizing spirit’ of merchants and manufacturers.” (234)

· “Among a nation of ‘manufacturers’ there is no leisure time. All is work, and every soldier is a laborer taken away from manufacturing… War being so very costly, there then follows a natural incentive both to maintain peace and to neglect defense.” (238)

· Schumpeter illustrates imperialist forces in six typical models: (1) Egyptian war machine, (2) warrior nations, (3) religious imperialism, (4) Alexandrine imperialism, (5) Roman imperialism, and (6) imperialism of the Court Nobilities. (244)

· “The further capitalism and democracy develop, the more imperialism will disappear.” (245)

· “War, [John Muller] says, has become obsolescent. A durable, long peace among the developed industrial powers has changed international relations. The obsolescence of war – the transformation of great powers politics – is, he argues, a function of two developments.” (1) Physical costs of war, ‘rationally unthinkable,’ and (2) psychic cost of war has increased, ‘sub-rationally unthinkable.’ (246 – 247)

8. Internationalism: Kant

· Kant postulates six preliminary articles: (1) no peace treaty will be considered valid if it harbors a secret intent, (2) no independent state should be subject to conquest, (3) standing armies will be gradually abolished, (4) no national debt will be incurred with the purpose of enhancing international power, (5) no state will forcibly interfere in the constitution or government of another, and (6) no state will commit war crimes. (256)

· Definitive articles

o First requires civil constitution of the state be republican.

o Second, Liberal republics will progressively establish peace among themselves by means of the pacific federation, or union… The pacific union will establish peace within a federation of free states and securely maintain the rights of each state.

o Third, establishes a cosmopolitan law to operate in conjunction with the pacific union. (257 – 258)

· Effects of Liberalism on the foreign relations of Liberal states

o Establishment of a peace among them.

o Aggression against non-Liberals.

o Supine complaisance – failure to support allies and failure to oppose enemies.

· “Republican caution does not end war or ensure that wars are fought only when necessary for national security.” (281)

· “The twin propositions – that Liberal democratic republics do not seem to go to war with one another yet seem to be as war-prone as any other regime – are seen as the foundation of the great global changes of our time.” (284)

· “A state of peace this in not the same as successful deterrence. It is a condition that should change expectations and attitudes and give rise to more extensive forms of dispute avoidance and international collaboration.” (285 – 286)

· Three conditions necessary for a stable expectation of peace among states: (1) representative, republican government, (2) principled respect for nondiscriminatory human rights, and (3) social and economic interdependence. (286 – 287)

· Hard cases: (1) Imperial German, (2) British nonintervention in the US Civil War, (3) Fashoda Crisis of 1898, and (4) covert actions. (289 – 292)

· “States of peace are distinguished from states of war when judicial processes, not coercive bargaining, settle disputes and when third parties are trusted to mediate conflicts.” (293)

· “Given all the instabilities of regime change, democratization may provoke more war.” (299)

Conclusion. Liberals and Realists: Explaining Differences

· “For none of the Liberals does the state of nature (without government) produce the state of war; for each the state of war must be made known by aggressive acts or declared intentions to aggress.” (301)

· “Realist theories can account for aspects of certain periods of international stability. And they each can account for incentives toward imprudent aggression and complaisance. But the logic of the balance of power and international hegemony does not explain the separate peace maintained for more than 150 years among states sharing one particular form of governance, Liberal principles and institution.” (305)

11. International Intervention

· “Doubting the efficacy of international law and morality as foundations for a obligation of nonintervention, Realists tend to see all states as caught in a state of war in which the only source of security is self-help. Security drives states then to focus on the relative capabilities and consequent search for predominance that is unrestrained by any factor but prudence.” (390)

· “International politics should cover no more than the prudent calculation of long-run security.” (391)

· Realist reasons to override the principle of nonintervention – prestige, imperial stability, and preventive war. (392)

· Liberal nonintervention. “Not having been able to win political power on their own, they would have few domestic supporters and many non-Liberal domestic enemies.” Three options: (1) rule as did the previous regime, (2) collapse in a civil war, or (3) intervenors would have continually to send in foreign support. (395 – 396)

· Liberal intervention. (1) Violation of rights of cosmopolitan freedom should be resisted, provided we can do so proportionally, without causing more harm than seeking to avoid. (2)Intervene to protect basic human rights. (3) Three exceptions: (1) too many nations contest one piece of territory, (2) counterintervention in a civil war, and (3) humanitarian purposes. (395 – 400)

· Case study of the US invasion of Grenada. (402 – 420)

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