Matt Domsalla

SAASS 600/12

Small Wars Precis

In Small Wars, Colonel C.E. Callwell provides a theory for campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops – expeditions against “savages and semi-civilized races” by disciplined soldiers, campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare.

Data: Callwell, Charles E. Small Wars: Their Principle and Practice. 3rd ed. (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1996)

Author: Callwell was a British imperial officer. He attended Haileybury, which educated sons of colonial soldiers and civil servants. He graduated from the Royal Military College and was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1878. He fought in the 1880 Afghan War and the First Boer War in 1881. He attended the staff college in 1878. He served with Greek forces in the Turko-Greek War of 1897. He retired in 1909 but was recalled to service during the Great War, where was the Director of Military Operations at the War office.

Context: Callwell wrote during the High Renaissance of imperialism. Imperialism expanded during the course of the latter nineteenth century because of political instability in Asia and Africa; European rivalries played out in the wider world, and officers and officials driven by patriotism and personal ambition, eager to claim vast stretches of territory for the Fatherland. How was a relative handful of Europeans with limited technological means to traverse an inaccessible country, conquer a numerically superior enemy, and pacify a new empire? Over time, European soldiers mastered these problems such that imperial conquest came to be regarded as hardly more than a technical problem to be solved. Imperial expansion met indifference, even hostility, at home. The benefits were not apparent to Europeans. The brutality of colonial wars that could be exploited by the opposition, the political risks of military reversal in far-flung wars, and the demands of home defense combined to make European politicians in the nineteenth century relocated to commit forces to expensive imperial expeditions.

Callwell argued technology is never decisive; rather, success in battle relied on the superior discipline, tactics, and morale of European troops.

(Porch, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare” in Paret’s Makers of Modern Strategy) Colonial warfare was the major military experience of both the British and French armies between Waterloo and the Marne. The enemy and nature of the terrain dictated French tactics in Africa. Mobility, small-unit operations, and surprise became more important in Africa than weight of numbers and conventional logistics. The theories of Bugeaud in Algeria, Gallieni in Tonkin, and Lyautey in Morocco created the “colonial school” of warfare. In Algeria, Bugeaud claimed unconventional tactics were the soul of that conflict. He utilized four principles: mobility, morale, leadership, and firepower. He also emphasized the value of scouting parties and intelligence reports. Skirmishing, rather than pitched battles became the rule in Algeria, and the emphasis on squares and fire discipline diminished. Bugeuad elevated the razzia to the level of total warfare.

In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the availability of bolt-action and magazine-fed rifles gave the French an incontestable technological advantage over opponents. It also allowed smaller numbers of men to campaign. Gallieni argues that, by catering to the interests of African merchants, France would be able to extend its influence without further recourse to brute force. Gallieni put into practice “progressive occupation.” Posts were established around which patrols would circulate, progressively extending the area of control until they touched upon that of an adjacent post. The post would become a market that attracted the natives, often by purchasing their goods at higher than market prices.

Lyautey advocated the “hearts and minds approach.” It assumed that all men could be taught to act in their own interests, as these interests were defined by Europeans; only a few fanatics might require more persuasive methods. In Morocco, Lyautey’s methods enjoyed less than complete success. “Hearts and minds” was more a public-relations exercise with the French people than a workable military formula in Morocco. Only by claiming he was “civilizing” Morocco, that the Moroccans actually preferred the French presence to their moral state of anarchy, could he sell colonial expansion to a French public skeptical of its value.

The nature of the enemy and the nature of the terrain dictated colonial strategy and tactics to a great degree. The essential problem of the French colonial army was not to decide how much of its colonial military experience was applicable to Europe, but how to keep European military practices, such as the persistent use of heavy columns, out of the colonies.

Colonial campaigns emphasized the value of battle over maneuver and offered a stunning demonstration of the superiority of firepower over numbers. Colonial soldiers contributed to the spirit, rather than to the techniques of the offensive. The offensive was not so much a strategic and tactical doctrine as an expression of the “moral force” unleashed in the colonies, which would regenerate France and its army.



Central Proposition:

· An ability to adapt to terrain and climate, to match the enemy in mobility and inventiveness, to collect intelligence, and above all the capacity to “seize what the enemy prizes most,” will determine success or failure in small wars.

· Nature of a war was determined, as far as it lay within the power of the counterinsurgent force to dictate the nature of the war, by what the commander wished to achieve.

Other Major Propositions:

· While tactics favored the European, strategy favored the resistance. By controlling the pace of the war, refusing battle, drawing the invader deep into hostile country where he became overextended and vulnerable, an intelligent enemy might negate European technological, operational, and tactical superiority. The goal of the invader, therefore, must be to achieve this collapse of enemy resistance as quickly as possible.


· Internal Consistency and Comprehensiveness –Callwell’s work has an over-reliance on operational solutions to political problems, unfortunately a failing characteristic both of the French experience in Indochina and Algeria, and that of the US in Vietnam. defined, categorized, explain, connect, complete?

· External Validity – The work seemed obsolete within a decade of its final publication because, as T.E. Lawerence belived, advantage had shifted irrevocably to the insurgency. Before 1914, native resistance usually failed because it lacked a common ideology or sense of self-interest. Western societies were poorly placed to respond to the nationalistic/revolutionary changes in social organization. After two world wars and the Cold War stalemate, most Western armies viewed small wars as missions to be avoided. However, insurgency movements are neither a modern phenomenon, nor are they unbeatable. Every insurgency assumes a different complexion given the circumstances – political, ideological, cultural, and geographic – which shape it.

Comparison and Synthesis:

Callwell applies a Clausewitzian paradigm: set clear goals, and do a thorough assessment of the enemy’s and your own capabilities before devising strategies to achieve those goals.


Personal Significance:


· “[Small wars] include all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consists of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertake to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.” (21)

· “Small wars include the partisan warfare which usually arises when trained soldiers are employed in the quelling of sedition and of insurrections in civilized countries; they include campaigns of conquest when a Great Power adds the territory of barbarous races to its possessions; and they include punitive expeditions against tribes bordering upon distant colonies.” (22)

· “The conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theaters of operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be carried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system. The art of war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case.” (23)

Causes of Small Wars

· “Small wars may broadly be divided into three classes – campaigns of conquest or annexation, campaigns for the suppression of insurrections or lawlessness or for the settlement of conquered or annexed territory, and campaigns undertaken to wipe out an insult, to avenge a wrong, or to overthrow a dangerous enemy.” (25)

· “In different small wars the hostile mode of conducting hostilities varies to a surprising extent. Strategy and tactics assume all manner of forms.” (32)

Objective in Small War

· “In small wars the habits, the customs, and the mode of action on the battlefield of the enemy should be studied in advance.” (33)

· “The selection of the objective in a small war will usually be governed in the first place by the circumstances which have led up to the campaign. Military operations are always undertaken with some end in view, and are shaped for its achievement.” (34)

· “A defeat inflicted upon a large force of irregular warriors terrified not only those engaged, but also all their kind. It is the difficulty of bringing the foe to action which, as a rule, forms the most unpleasant characteristic of these wars; but when such opponents can be thoroughly beaten in the open field at the commencement of hostilities, their powers of further serious resistance often cease.” (38)

· “In warfare of this nature it is half the battle to have a distinct task to perform.” (39)

· “It is then that the regular troops are force to resort to cattle lifting and village burning and that the war assumes an aspect which may shock the humanitarian.” (40)

· “The most satisfactory way of bringing such foes to reason is by the rifle and sword, for they understand this mode of warfare and respect it.” (41)


· “The difficulties which arise from this ignorance of the conditions under which the regular army will be operating really divide themselves into two main headings; difficulties arising from want of knowledge of the theater of war, and difficulties consequent upon the doubt that exists as to the strength, the organization, and the fighting qualities of the enemy.” (44)

· “There is almost always doubt as to the fighting strength of the enemy.” (47)

· “In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far the people of the hostile country, or in minor operations the hostile tribe, will put forth their entire strength.” (49)

· “One other difficulty which the regular army has sometimes to contend with in small wars is treachery on the part ostensibly neutral bodies or tribes, while in civilized wars such a thing is almost unknown.” (50)

· “News spreads in a most mysterious fashion. The people are far more observant than the dwellers in civilized lands.” (54)

· “The conditions vary so greatly in small wars that the principles which govern them, as a whole, are the highest degree elastic.” (56)

Influence of Supply

· In small wars supply presents not only great difficulties in the way of organization, but exerts also a powerful influence over actual tactics when the regular troops meet their antagonists in conflict.” (60)

· “It becomes necessary to cut down the forces engaged to the lowest possible strength consistent with safety, and that campaigns have to be embarked upon with armies barely capable numerically of performing the work which they may have in hand.” (60)

· “A failure of the water supply means disaster if not annihilation.” (61)

· “The question of water exercises at times a dominant influence over the course of these campaigns.” (62)

· The broad principle is to advance with the smallest force consistent with safety under the given circumstances, and to store sufficient food for the whole army to be enabled to perform its allotted task.” (66)


· “For it is a cardinal principle in the conduct of warfare of this nature that the initiative must be maintained, that the regular army must lead while its adversaries follow, and that the enemy must be made to feel a moral inferiority throughout. The lower races are impressionable. They are greatly influenced by a resolute bearing and by a determined course of action.” (72)

· “It cannot be insisted upon too strongly that in a small war the only possible attitude to assume is, speaking strategically, the offensive.” (75)

· “Victory has been achieved by vigor and dash rather than by force of numbers. The spirit of attack inspiring leaders and subordinates alike has won the day for us.” (78)

· “In small wars a single blow will often achieve important results, but a succession of blows paralyzes the enemy.” (80)

Object is to Fight, not to Maneuver

· “It is a singular feature of small wars that from the point of view of strategy the regular forces are upon the whole at a distinct disadvantage as compared to their antagonists.” (85)

· “Superior armament, the force of discipline, a definite and acknowledged chain of responsibility, esprit de corps, the moral force of civilization, all these work together to give the trained and organize army an incontestable advantage from the point of view of tactics.” (90)

· “Since tactics favor the regular troops while strategy favors the enemy, the object to be sought for clearly is to fight, not to maneuver, to meet the hostile forces in open battle, not to compel them to give way by having recourse to strategy… to beat irregular opponents and savages, the most efficacious plan is to engage them on every possible occasion.” (91)

· “When there is a chance of a fight it should not be allowed to slip by.” (92)

Enemy Brought to Battle

· “[It is essential] to prevent the struggle from degenerating into desultory warfare, to regular troops the most tedious and harassing form which hostilities can assume.” (97)

· “Guerilla warfare is the most unfavorable shape which a campaign can take for the regular troops.” (99)

· “Half measures are fatal.” (101

· “Petty annoyance is the favorite weapon of the guerilla, and regular troops are sorely tempted to retaliate in the same coin, to haggle as it were with the hostile gatherings instead of enduring worry and molestation for a season, biding their time till they can strike home.” (102)

· “For general engagements are the object to be aimed at.” (103)

· “Battles, then, are the objects to be sought for by the regular troops, and since the enemy as a general rule shirks engagement in the open field, the strongest grounds exist for tempting him to fight, for drawing him on by skillful dispositions, and for inducing him to enter eagerly upon the conflict if he shows symptoms of inclination for a battle.” (106)

Division of Force

· “Division of force in the theater of war is generally held to be a bad strategy, and with good reason… [yet] in small wars separation in the field is often a necessary consequence of the conditions of the campaign.” (108)

Lines of Communication

· “Unless, in fact, an adequate force is detailed to protect the line, or lines, of communications there is always great risk of their being cut temporarily or permanently.” (117)

· “An army cast loose from its communications enjoys great liberty of action.” (118)

· “An army without communications in a hostile country, which meets with a reverse, is in a very serious plight.” (122)

Guerilla Warfare

· “Guerilla warfare is a form of operations above all things to be avoided.” (125)

· “Guerilla warfare is what the regular armies always have most to dread, and when this is directed by a leader with a genius for war, an effective campaign becomes well-nigh impossible. (126)

· “In no class of warfare is a well organized and well served intelligence department more essential than in that against guerillas.” (143)

· “The adoption of guerilla methods by the enemy almost necessarily forces the regular troops to resort to punitive measure directed against the possessions of their antagonists.” (145)

· “Uncivilized races attribute lenience to timidity.” (148)

USMC Small Wars Manual 1940

Chapter 1 – General Characteristics

· “Small wars. Are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation.” (23)

· “The assistance rendered in the affairs of another state may vary from a peaceful act suc as the assignment of an administrative assistant, which is certainly nonmilitary and not placed under the classification of small wars, to the establishment of a complete military government supported by an active combat force.” (23)

· “Small wars vary in degrees from simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war.” (23)

· “Small wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps. During about 85 of the last 100 years, the Marine Corps has been engaged in small wars in different parts of the world.” (24)

· “Most of the small wars of the United States have resulted from the obligation of the Government under the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and have been undertaken to suppress lawlessness or insurrection.” (24)

· “According to international law, as recognized by the leading nations of the world, a nation may protect, or demand protection for, its citizens and their property wherever situated.” (24)

· “The use of the forces of the United States in foreign countries to protect the lives and property of American citizens resident in those countries does not necessarily constitute an act of war, and is, therefore, not equivalent to a declaration of war. (25)

· “Small wars… are therefore conducted in a manner different from major warfare. In small wars, diplomacy has not ceased to function and the State Department exercises a constant and controlling influence over the military operations.” (26)

· “The actual operations of small wars may be arbitrarily divided into five phases as follows” Phase 1. Initial demonstration or landing and action of vanguard. Phase 2. The arrival of reinforcements and general military operations in the field. Phase 3. Assumption of control of executive agencies, and cooperation with the legislative and judicial agencies. Phase 4. Routine police functions. Phase 5. Withdrawal from the Theater of Operations.” (27)

· Phase 1 – Forces “dribble in.” (27)

· Phase 2 – Forces seize and hold the most important city in the area assigned and send combat patrols in all directions. (28)

· Phase 3 – May be necessary to resort to “more thorough measures,” such as establishing a military government or martial law. (28)

· Phase 4 – Military police functions and judicial authority are gradually returned “to the native agencies top which they properly belong.” Marines act as a reserve in support of the native forces and are actively employed only in “grave emergencies.” (29)

· Phase 5 – Order is restored or native agencies are prepared to handle the situation without other support, troops withdraw. (30)

· “The future opponent may be as well armed as they [the Marines] are; he will be able to concentrate a numerical superiority against isolated detachments at the time and place he chooses; as in the past he will have a thorough knowledge of the trails, the country, and the inhabitants; and he will have the inherent ability to withstand all the natural obstacles, such as climate and disease, to a greater extent than a white man. All these natural advantages, combining primitive cunning and modern armament, will weigh heavily in the balance against the advantage of the marine forces in organization, equipment, intelligence, and discipline, if a careless audacity is permitted to warp good judgment.” (30)

· “Although small wars present a special problem requiring particular tactical and technical measure, the immutable principles of war remain the basis of these operations and require the greatest ingenuity in their application.” (30)

· “The military strategy of small wars is more directly associated with the political strategy of the campaign than is the case in major operations.” (32)

· “The State Department materially influences the strategy and tactics by orders and instructions which are promulgated through the Navy Department or through diplomatic representatives.” (32 – 33)

· “Wars of intervention have two classifications; intervention in the internal, or intervention in the external affairs of another state. Intervention in the internal affairs of a state may be undertaken to restore order, to sustain governmental authority, to obtain redress, or to enforce the fulfillment of obligations binding between two states. Intervention in the external affairs of a state may be the result of a treaty which authorizes one state to aid another as a matter of political expediency, to avoid more serious consequences when the interests of other states are involved, or to gain certain advantages not obtainable otherwise.” (33)

· “The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.” (34)

· “In small wars it can be expected that hostile forces in occupied territory will employ guerilla warfare as a means of gaining their end… In warfare of this kind, members of native forces will suddenly become innocent peasant workers when it suits their fancy and convenience.” (35)

· “The occupying force must be strong enough to hold all the strategical points of the country, protect its communications, and at the same time furnish an operating force sufficient to overcome the opposition wherever it appears.” (36)

· “A study of men and human nature supplemented by a thorough knowledge of psychology should enable those faced with concrete situations of this type to avoid the ordinary mistakes.” (38 – 39)

· “Instead of employing force, one strives to accomplish the purpose by diplomacy.” (39)

· “The correct application of the principles of psychology to any given situation requires a knowledge of the traits peculiar to the persons with whom we are dealing.” (40)

· “Some of the fundamental policies applicable to almost any situation are: (1) social customs such as class distinction, dress, and similar items should be recognized and receive due consideration, (2) political affiliations or the appearance of political favoritism should be avoided; while a thorough knowledge of the political situation is essential, a strict neutrality in such matters should be observed, and (3) a respect for religious customs. Indifference in all the above matters can only be regarded as a lack of tack.” (40)

· “The knowledge of the people at any given moment of history involves an understanding of their environment, and above all, their past.” (40)

· “political revolutions ordinarily result from real or fancied grievances, existing in the minds of some few men, but many other causes may produce them. The word ‘discontent’ sums them up.” (41)

· “The rapidity with which a revolution develops in made possible by modern communications facilities and publicity methods.” (41) (Arab Spring, application of Facebook and Twitter.)

· “Governments often almost totally fail to sense the temper of their people.” (41)

· “Abuses by the officials in power and their oppression of followers of the party not in power, are often the seeds of revolution.” (42)

· “A knowledge of the laws relating to the psychology of crowds is indispensible to the interpretation of the elements of revolutionary movements, and to their conduct. Each individual of the crowd, based on the mere fact that he is one of many, senses an invincible power which at once nullifies the feeling of personal responsibility. The spirit of individual irresponsibility and loss of identity must be overcome be preventing the mobilization or concentration of revolutionary forces, and by close supervision of the actions of individuals.” (43)

· Basic instincts – fear, self-assertion, self-submission, pride in sovereignty, proud individually, childlike characteristics in inhabitants with high rates of illiteracy, wariness of outsiders, presentation of gifts or bribery, accept hospitality of natives. (44 – 47)

· “Delay in the use of force, and hesitation to accept responsibility for its employment when the situation clearly demands it, will always be interpreted as a weakness.” (48)

· The strength of suggestion is dependent upon the following factors: last impression, frequency, and repetition. (49)

· “In small wars also, it is well to strike most vigorously and relentlessly when the going is the easiest. When the opponents are on the run, give them no peace or rest, or time to make further plans.” (50)

· “There is no service which calls for greater exercise of judgment, persistency, patience, tact, and rigid military justice than in small wars, and nowhere is more of the humane and sympathetic side of a military force demanded than in this type of operation.” (52)

· “In major warfare, hatred of the enemy is developed among troops to arouse courage. In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote of our relationship with the mass of the population.” (53)

· “Psychological errors may be committed which antagonize the population of the country occupied and all the foreign sympathizers; mistakes may have the most far-reaching effect and it may require a long period to reestablish confidence, respect, and order.” (53)

· “Upon the arrival of the United States forces at the main point of entry the commander thereof should endeavor, through the medium of the United States diplomatic representative, to confer with the Chief Executive of the government, or his authorized representative and impart such information as may be required by the directive he has received.” (61)

· “Cordial relationship between our forces and the civilian population is best maintained by engendering the spirit of good will.” (65)

· “The homely advice: ‘Don’t dabble in politics’ is wise, and military authorities should scrupulously avoid discussing the subject… members of the United States forces should avoid any attitude that tends to indicate criticism or lack of respect for the religious beliefs and practices observed by the native inhabitants.” (65 – 66)

Chapter 2 - Organization

· “In a major war, the mission assigned to the armed forces is usually unequivocal – the defeat and destruction of the hostile forces. This is seldom true in small wars. More often than not, the mission will be to establish and maintain law and order by supporting or replacing the civil government in countries or areas in which the interest of the United States have been placed in jeopardy, in order to insure the safety and security of our nationals, their property and interests.” (72)

· Factors to be considered in estimating enemy strength: political status, economic status and logistic support available, geographical features, climate conditions, information and security service of the enemy, material characteristics (except for aviation, the decided advantage in arms and equipment enjoyed by intervening troops in the past will seldom obtain in the future), composition, condition, and disposition of enemy forces, and racial characteristics, morale, and skill. (73 – 76)

· “Generally, their intentions will be to make surprise attacks against the intervening forces in superior numbers and against undefended local villages and towns. To offset such action, patrols must be strong enough in numbers and armament to withstand any anticipated attack or ambush, and the principal villages and towns must be given adequate protection.” (76)

· “More frequently, it will be necessary to initiate active combat operations against the large groups of opposing forces which occupy certain areas.” (77)

· “In military operations of small wars, strategical and tactical principles are applied to attain the political objective of the government. The political objective indicates the general character of the campaign which the military leader will undertake. The campaign plan indicates the military objective and, in general terms, the nature and method of conducting the campaign.” (78)

· “Tactical operations of regular troops against guerillas in small wars are habitually offensive.” (78)

Chapter 5 – Initial Operations

· “The foreign policy of the United States relative to domestic disorders in unstable countries is one of nonintervention. However, as a measure to safeguard our nationals and, incidental thereto, other foreign national, havens of refuge will no doubt be established at certain sea ports of an unstable country whenever the domestic disorder threatens the lives of these nationals.” (194)

· “As in all forms of warfare, logistic requirements must be given careful consideration in preparing strategic and tactical plans; in fact such requirements are frequently the determining factor.” (197)

· “A flying column is defined as a detachment, usually of all arms, operating at a distance from, and independent of, a main body or supporting troops, lightly equipped to insure mobility and sufficiently strong to exempt it from being tied to a base of supplies through a fixed line of communications. A mobile column is of the same description as the flying column with the exception that it is self-supporting to a lesser degree and is dependent for its existence on its base of supplies.” (198)

· “The mission of the flying column will be to seek out the hostile groups, attack them energetically, and then pursue them to the limit.” (198)

· “Among the various methods that have been used for the pacification of an area infested with irregulars are: occupation of an area, patrols, roving patrols, zones of refuge, cordon system (offensive nature), blockhouse system (defensive nature), and special methods.” (209)

· “Patrolling is essentially offensive action.” (210)

Chapter 11 – Disarmament of Population

· “Due to the unsettled conditions ordinarily prevailing in a country requiring a neutral intervention, and the existence of many arms in the hands of the inhabitants, the disarming of the general population of that country is not only extremely important as a part of the operation of the intervening forces but also to the interests of the inhabitants themselves..” (381)

Chapter 12 – Armed Native Organizations

· “When the domestic situation of a foreign country is such that it is necessary for the United States Government to intervene, the national and local armed forces of the country concerned are usually powerless to suppress the domestic disorder or enforce the laws… In order to discharge this responsibility [to protect the life and property of the inhabitants], it may become necessary for the United States forces to assume the functions of the national armed forces of the foreign country in addition to the duties of the local and municipal policy” (400)

Chapter 13 – Military Government

· “Military government is the exercise of military jurisdiction by a military commander… superseding as far as may be deemed expedient, the local law.” (425)

· “The most important distinction between military government and martial law is, that the former is a real government exercised for a more or less extended period by a military commander over the belligerents or other inhabitants of an enemy’s country in war, foreign or civil; martial law, on the other hand, is military authority called into action, when and to the extent that public danger requires it, in localities or districts of the home country which still maintain adhesion to the general government. The subjects of military government are the belligerents or other inhabitants of occupied territory, those of martial law are the inhabitants of our own territory who, though perhaps disaffected or in sympathy with a public enemy, are not themselves belligerents or enemies.” (425)

Chapter 14 – Supervision of Elections

· “By accepting the responsibility for such supervision [of elections], the Government of the United States has settled serious political disturbances and assisted in the reestablishment of law and order.” (447)

· “The supervision of an election is perhaps the most effective peaceful means of exerting an impartial influence upon the turbulent affairs of sovereign states.” (447)

· “A free, fair, and impartial election cannot be held in a country torn by civil strife. Before such an election can be held, the individual must be made to feel safe in his everyday life.” (449)

Chapter 15 - Withdrawal

· “In accordance with national policy, it is to be expected that small wars operations will not be conducted with a view to the permanent acquisition of any foreign territory. A force engaged in small wars operations may expect to be withdrawn from foreign territory as soon as its mission is accomplished.” (482)

· “For convenience of analysis, withdrawal is divided into two phases; the withdrawal from active military operations and the final withdrawal.” (482)

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